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Abstract 
Work on board offshore drilling installations are hazardous, the personnel need to be 
vigilant in every part of the work in order to keep the risk level at a minimum. To have a critical 
incident, multiple barriers need to be broken, and that is what drill crews prevent on a daily basis. 
Critical incidents on an offshore installation, like a semisubmersible rig, can have disastrous 
outcomes to personnel, equipment and environment. We only have to look at the Piper Alpha, 
1988 (Northsea). Alexander L. Kielland, 1980 (Northsea). Ocean Ranger, 1982 (North Atlantic) 
and Deepwater Horizon, 2010 (Gulf of Mexico),  incidents to confirm this. In these accident a 
total of 285 people lost their lives, all rigs got totally destroyed, enormous financial losses and 
the environment took heavy damage from oil pollution. So what can be done to help prevent 
this? This study aim to build upon the results of (Martinsen, 2013; Øvergård, Sorensen, 
Martinsen, & Nazir, 2014). The purpose of this study was to identify characteristics of critical 
incidents and the characteristics of decision-making in offshore drilling. The targeted group is 
offshore drilling personnel. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 14 persons that have 
a minimum of 10 years experience from drilling. The interviews provided 19 critical incident 
recollections and 9 incidents were dropped after the interviews. These were transcribed and 
thematically analyzed. Findings of this study include experienced adoption to operation 
characterized critical incidents in offshore drilling, routine complacency is a major contributor to 
incidents happening and some inconsistency to existing Endsley's three level SA model. 
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Introduction 
Since early 1990's the oil and gas industry has continuously worked to increase safety and 
reduce accidents. These efforts has paid off, from 1990 to 2005 Norway has reduced offshore 
accidents by 20% (Authority, 2006). In most accidents in the industrial sector, there is causality 
between an organizations condition and the human errors (Turner & Pidgeon, 1997), and 
(Reason, 1990) indicates that human factors contribute as much as 70 to 80% of accidents in 
high risk industry. One way to reduce the number of accidents is to increase the offshore workers 
SA in operations on board (Endsley & Garland, 2000). Herein lies the ability to have an 
sufficient understanding of ongoing and upcoming operations, and to keep a high level of SA 
related to operations and the surrounding environment. The key point here is to understand how 
variables may change and to predict the outcome of multiple situational developments (Endsley, 
1995a).  
In many aspects this comes down to attention to tasks at hand and how this affects 
operations around. In cognitive psychology there has long been an interest in attention (Balota & 
Marsh, 2004), and the importance of attention to tasks with regards to accident prevention is well 
established (Paté-Cornell, 1993). In the industry the concept broadened to entail more than just 
attention, and the coined term is Situational Awareness (SA). There were a lot of different takes 
on SA in the early 1990 (Sarter & Woods, 1995); (Wiener, 1993); (Judge, 1992) and the concept 
was not properly defined or agreed upon. SA was mostly connected with aviation (Endsley & 
Garland, 2000). In 1995 Endsley proposed a starting point for a defined SA theory (Endsley, 
1995b). This became a leading take on SA (Salmon et al., 2008) and guided a lot of the coming 
works that broadened the field of SA to include aircraft maintenance (Endsley & Robertson, 
2000) and the military (Strater, Jones, & Endsley, 2001).  
Critical incident into large scale disaster 
Routine is what is used to describe activities that are done as a normal part of a job or 
process.  It's when something happens to disturb the routine we need to react. The definition of a 
critical event is according to Flanagan (1954, p. 338) ‘an incident is critical if it makes a 
‘significant’ contribution, either positively or negatively to the general aim of the activity’ and it 
should be capable of being critiqued or analyzed’.   
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When a critical incident is not controlled it can escalate to a large scale disaster like the 
Deepwater Horizon accident in the Gulf of Mexico. This is what offshore personnel work 
towards each day with all the routines, procedures and checklists that are in place. 
Situation awareness 
Here is a brief description of Situational awareness (SA) as described by (Sneddon, 
Mearns, & Flin, 2006). The notion of SA has been in existence for many years, with references 
to the concept believed to originate from the pilot community of World War I. The most cited 
definition of SA is "... the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of 
space and time, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the 
near future" (Endsley, 1988, p. 792). SA involves concentration, attention to detail, and 
vigilance, which in turn create a sensitivity to cues in the environment signaling a change of 
state. (Sarter & Woods, 1991, p. 50) state that SA "... is based on the integration of knowledge 
resulting from recurrent situation assessments," i.e. by continually appraising the situation and 
incorporating facts from it. The theory of SA draws upon the fundamentals of information 
processing, in that it is a cognitive process that involves the perception of information from the 
environment, and the amalgamation of this information with what is already known to form an 
understanding of the situation, all within the confines of the working memory (Smith & 
Hancock, 1995). The result is three levels of SA: perception, comprehension/information 
integration, and projection. Endsley’s definition and triadic model (Endsley, 1995b) still 
dominate the field, and her model has been adopted here for analytical  purposes. 
Endsley parts SA into 3 levels where the first level of SA involving the perception of tasks 
and situational related cues in their immediate surroundings. To achieve the first level of SA one 
must perceive status, attributes and dynamics of the relevant elements in the environment. 
Attention is paid to the environmental cues that are relevant to the current situation in light of the 
actor's goals and experience in terms of mental models. The second level of SA involves whether 
one is able to understand the elements and their meaning. It involves whether one is able to 
understand the elements and their impact that they identified at SA level 1 in relation to the goal 
of the task. When one achieves the second level of SA, the participant develops a distinct 
understanding of the importance of the elements considered in the first level of SA. The 
participant now has full understanding of what each item means in the context of his or her 
5 
 
situation and goals for the task. To get on the third level of SA one must be able to predict the 
future state of the elements of the environment. Using the information from SA level 1 and 2, as 
well as experience in terms of mental models, an participant predict or anticipate future 
conditions in the situation. For example, a driver anticipate that the car in front of him is going to 
brake sharply, as a result of that he has observed a queue in front of the car. Operators can 
effectively predict future events based on past experience and on the preceding level of SA. 
Endsley notes that experienced operators are better to achieve the 3rd level of SA as they use 
mental models shaped by experience with similar scenarios. 
Recognition primed decision RPD 
The decision process can be explained by two steps; situation assessment and selection of 
alternative actions. Recognition Primed decision (RPD) is widely used in NDM to explain 
decisions. Through analysis they have found that experienced decision makers in most cases 
make decisions once the problem is identified. These were experts in their field and generated 
only a single option. The choice was pulled out of different patterns that they had collected 
through both real and virtual experiences over many years. The alternative was evaluated by 
mentally simulating about it would work in this current situation. If the option seemed 
appropriate would it be conducted without a first compared this with other alternative. Only 
when not option could be adapted to an appropriate solution would decision makers envision 
next option (Kahneman & Klein, 2009). Those who are recognized within their profession to 
have the necessary qualities and skills to perform at the highest level within NDM are defined as 
experts (Kahneman & Klein, 2009). This definition may be somewhat vague, but is still 
satisfactory for most studies within NDM. Intuitive decision making is a strategy that separates 
the beginners from the experts. The expert has, unlike beginners, experience to recognize 
patterns, but also to identify when the situation is new for him and it is not appropriate to use 
intuitive decision making. One danger of intuitive decision strategy is that individuals sometimes 
make decisions that is successful by chance. These individuals will be prone to the illusion of 
skill and assertiveness. Later they will see themselves as experts and taking intuitive decisions 
deficient basis. They have more confidence in their own ratings than it actually is justified. 
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Figur 1 - Model of recognition-primed decision making. (Decision making in action: Models and 
methods. G. A. Klein, J. Orasanu, R. Calderwood, C. E. Zsambok, Editors. Copyright © 1993 by 
Ablex Publishing Corporation. Norwood, NJ. Adapted for use by Author. 
Method 
Sampling 
This study used, to a degree a probabilistic sampling in the regards that the population 
sample could have been any randomly chosen fifteen drillers with experience offshore.  The 
sample is a convenience, purposive, expert sample of the above mentioned group. The entire 
population was taken from the interviewer's working environment at a major international 
drilling company, which is as heterogeneous as any group of experienced offshore drillers in 
Norway can be. Drillers working offshore in Norway tend to move a lot around from rig to rig 
and from company to company therefore there was no need to sample a population from other 
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parts of the industry. Subjects found other places in the North sea might just as well recall an 
incident from the same rig most population was taken from. There were negligible amounts of 
experts with foreign experience among the population. 
Criteria's for the population.  
The participants had to have at least 10 years of experience from offshore drilling, and at 
least 3 years of experience as "in the chair" drillers. All participants have worked their way up 
from deckhands to the current positions. 6 of the participants has experience from higher 
positions on board offshore drilling units. When approaching possible participants a couple of 
pre probe questions were used to pre eliminate candidates that did not meet the criteria's for the 
study. This was done for several reasons, among them to save time and not to needlessly disturb 
fellow workers.  
 
Figure 2 - Overview of sequential pre probe questions to approve candidates for participation. 
 
Criteria's for including the incident.  
The participants had to be directly involved in the incident, working as the "on shift" driller 
and responding to the incident to be admitted. Recollections of other incidents were excluded 
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from the study. Some participants answered quite short to some of the questions, but were still 
admitted in the study. Only two incidents were recalled from the same rig. 
Participants. 
All participants in this study had at least 10 years of offshore experience, a minimum of 3 
years working actively as drillers on an offshore drilling unit and recollected at least on incident 
where they had been working as primary point of action. All participants were considered 
professionals within the respective field of offshore drilling, ranging from proficient to experts 
(Ericsson, 2007). 39 Participants were considered for this study. 20 did not meet the probe 
question criteria due to lacking in either experience, incident of interest or time in driller 
positions.  4 qualified candidates declined to participate.  
The final sample consisted of 15 candidates. All were interviewed between January and 
April 2015. The age ranged from 28 to 58 years (mean = 44,7; σ = 7,9). Offshore drilling 
experience ranged from 10 to 32 years (mean = 18,7; σ = 6,2). Experience as drillers ranged from 
3 to 22 years (mean = 6,3; σ = 4,9). All except one participant had experience from both RAM 
rig and semi-submersible rig. Six participants had experience from higher position than driller. 
All except one participants had technical college, the highest education was technical college, the 
lowest degree was a 18 week course. 
One interview were lost due to equipment problems, and the interview was deleted.  
Critical incidents 
During the interviews the participants described 19 number of critical incidents that were 
analyzed after transcription. 9 of the participants described only one incident the others described 
two. 
Critical events are defined as events that are rare, uncertain with potentially high and broad 
consequences (Stewart & Bostrom, 2002). There will always be a limited opportunity for 
preparing and learning about them due to their rarity. They are also difficult to foresee and train 
for, only the handling of a broader set of events is possible to plan for. The risk in critical events 
encompass threats to life, environment or property. 
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Data collection 
The data in this thesis is stems from interviews of offshore drilling personnel conducted to 
learn more about the characteristics of critical decision in drilling operation incidents. Semi-
structured interviews that were based on a modified version of the critical incident technique 
(CIT) the critical decision method (CDM) collected data on drillers decision making during 
critical events. A demographic questionnaire collected data about the drillers expert 
characteristics. 
Procedure 
The author performed all the initial contact with candidates and collected all the data. If the 
candidate was accepted (See Criteria's for the population.) they were briefed about the reason for 
the interview and the objectives for the study. He, all accessible candidates to this study were 
male, were then asked if participation in this study were of interest. All except 4 of the accepted 
candidates chose to participate. For those who accepted to participate, a time and place for the 
interview were  scheduled. Before the interview took place all participants were informed in 
more detail about the purpose of the study. General information about measures taken to 
guarantee confidentiality was also provided. Candidates were informed that participation in the 
study was voluntary and that the interviews would be used for research purposes. They were 
explained about the participants rights to withdraw their participation at any time up until a 
certain point, that after the transcription of the interview were done and the interview recording 
were deleted it was impossible for the researcher to erase their participation due to the anonymity 
of each participant. All were given an explanation about what their involvement would entail and 
their impact of the study results. The participant were explained that the interview were taking 
the form of an informal conversation, and that the interview would follow a mixed structure of 
critical incident technique and critical decision method, basically a retelling of a story with probe 
questions along the way. The nature and purpose of CTI and CDM were explained to all 
participants. All participants were presented with a demographic questionnaire. The 
questionnaire included 7 questions, determining sex, age, education and experience, offshore 
drilling experience and a brief description of various offshore drilling systems experience. The 
participants gave oral consent to the participation during the interview. Interviews were 
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conducted at various locations of convenience, such as situation room, offices or drillers cabin. 
All locations were selected so participants were comfortable and felt at ease. Due to various 
circumstances some of the interviews were conducted at participants worksite during their 
working shift. This was requested by the participants themselves as not to do this during their 
"off watch" hours. The interviews lasted from half an hour to a little more than an hour. The 
interview structure made all participants feel at ease and enjoy the experience. This allowed for 
in-depth probing at places of interest during the interview. The fact that the author is an expert in 
offshore drilling and also work in this environment full time helps the probing during the 
interview and helps participants share more intimate details of the incidents than to non 
consecrated interviewee.  
Critical decision method 
Critical Decision Making (CDM) is a recollective method of interview that employs a set 
of cognitive probes to non-routine incidents that required expert understanding or decision 
making (Klein, Calderwood, & MacGregor, 1998). Like other cognitive task analysis methods 
CDM is intended to reveal information about human knowledge and thinking processes during 
decision making, particularly during non-routine decision making (Klein et al., 1998) in 
naturalistic decision making environment (Militello & Lim, 1995). The procedure of the method 
is to start by participant recalling an incident and describing it. The interviewee then recount the 
incident to ensure it has been understood properly. As the recalling is told the interviewee notes 
the decision points in the incident, disclosed via direct questioning. The questions utilized for 
this can be "When did you first notice something was amiss?", "Was there any pre warnings?" or 
"Who initially discovered the problem, and how?". The goal here is to identify the points where; 
(i) data were received or sensed, (ii) decisions were made or (iii) actions were taken (Mendonça, 
2007). At this point the interviewee uses probe questions to deepen the understanding of the 
situation.  During the interview it was used 13 reference questions, see  
Table 1, to gather information about the characteristics of critical incidents and decision 
making in offshore drilling operations. The questions were used to be able to correlate with the 
results form (Martinsen, 2013).  
 
Table 1 - CDM probe reference in interview questions 
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NR Probe type Probe question 
Q1 Baseline reference Can you describe a regular workday in drilling? 
Q2 Baseline reference What do you consider a critical incident?   
Q3 Problem What happened? Please describe. 
Q4 Goal What were you trying to achieve when this incident 
occurred? 
Q5 Cue How did you act? 
Q6 Expectancy Did you expect something to occur? 
Q7 Situation awareness Can you describe which information were available for you 
at the time?  
Q8 Information integration What was the most important piece of information 
available? 
Q9 Uncertainty Were you at any time uncertain about the reliability or 
relevance of the information available to you? 
Q10 Conceptual Could you have acted differently in this situation? Made a 
different decision?  
Q11 Decision blocking Was it at any point challenging to process the information 
available to you?  
Q12 Recognition In this incident, were you reminded of previous 
experiences, where a similar decision was made? 
Q13 Recognition In this incident, were you reminded of previous 
experiences, where a different decision was made? 
 
For the interview itself it started with the participant describing their view of a regular 
workday, this was done to make a background reference. They were in question two asked to 
explain what a critical incident meant to them, this needed to be done in order to confirm that the 
incident they were about to describe actually were in the category of critical incident. Questions 
3 to 13 were intertwined in the interview to gather detailed information about the incident, to be 
able to timeline decisions and be able to use the gathered data for analyzing critical incidents 
offshore.  
Data Analysis 
An exploratory thematic analysis were conducted on all interviews to organize the 
qualitative data in the interviews. It followed the four stages set by (Bryman, 2012). Stage 1; 
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Familiarize with the data, read the text as a whole, look for what it is about, find major themes, 
unusual issues, events and group together. Stage 2; Reread the text again, mark off key words 
and paragraphs, label for nodes, note any analytic ideas suggested. Stage 3; Code the text, 
systematically mark the text, indicate what chunks of text are and theme them, review the nodes, 
combine duplicates. Stage 4; Relate general ideas to the text, add own interpretation, identify 
significance for respondent, find interconnections between the nodes, relate nodes to research 
questions and research literature. All the data was also coded multiple times for different topics 
in mind.   
Coding Software 
The data collected in the interviews were analyzed using NVivo10 version 10.0.638.0 SP6 
(64-bit). The use of NVivo greatly increased the abilities for coding multiple times on the same 
data, and after different topics. After the interviews were conducted they were listened to again 
to get a feel for the data. Then all interviews were transcribed, read and listened through and 
imported into NVivo10. In the software all interviews were coded in three different way. First 
they were coded open-minded, where the author coded any part with any node that seemed to be 
of interest.  Then they were coded using preconceived theories of Situation Awareness (Endsley, 
1995b) finally they were coded systematically where the nodes were generated based on the two 
other coding see example Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3 - Example extract of final node structure used on transcripts. 
After the third coding additional coding runs were performed. This was done with regards 
to information gathering on select topics that came of interest later in the study. These include 
but do not limit to "Description of critical events" "Themed statements" "Consequence 
hierarchy" and "Base event identification" 
13 
 
Description of critical incidents.  
Another main question during the interview Q2 was "What do you consider a critical 
incident?". This question resulted in 11 themes. The themes that only occurred once was 
discarded, that left 5 themes in this category (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2 - Themes occurring in critical incident description 
Theme Sources References 
01 Endagering people 6 7 
02 Damage equipment 4 5 
03 Wellcontrol 4 5 
04 Unexpected 3 3 
05 Loss of barriers 2 2 
 
The lack of consistent description of a critical incident may be a result of training offshore. 
Offshore personnel are constantly enrolled in courses offshore and onshore to be better able to 
cope with unexpected situations and to improve safety; Falck Nutec - Crisis management; 
Proactima - Investigation into unwanted incidents; UIS - Risk management; Ensure - Plan Do 
Check Act. A report (Kviseth & Øien, 2010) has this description: 
"Level 1 - Comprehensive critical events: Events that have resulted in death, 
serious injury, very high contamination and / or significant damage to 
property.  
Level 2 - Critical events: Events with high loss potential (red incidents in 
Synergi).." 
Another description is from NORSOK S-006: 
"Critical event: An incident which has caused or could have caused injury, 
illness and / or damage / loss of property, damage to the environment or third 
party (NORSOK S- 006)" 
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NORSOK and PTIL is the two most prominent standardization institutions regarding the 
offshore industry in Norway and they have huge influence worldwide. When they can't be 
consistent with the descriptions then it's even more difficult for the persons far removed from the 
institutions themselves. One participants understanding of critical incidents comes close to the 
standards: 
"Yes critical event that's when, uh it's, like, I immediately think, there are 
three types of critical incidents and it's kind of HSE related with people, 
personnel who may be injured. That is, uh, regarding equipment failure. and 
it is well-related events in terms of reservoir and inflow in the well and that 
type of thing." 
In this thesis we'll use this definition on critical incidents. Critical incidents are events that 
are unplanned, non-routine but do not end tragically yet have the potential to develop into large 
scale accidents. (Øvergård, Sorensen, Martinsen, & Nazir, 2015). All incidents related to in this 
thesis are based on this description to be included in the data. 
Results 
Characteristics of incidents 
There were four characteristics of critical incidents that stood out from the dataset. This 
was not because every characteristic occurred in all incidents, but because they were central to 
all incidents they did occur in, the participants put emphasis on the them. Under the table will 
follow a short description of each characteristic with reference from the interviews. 
 
Table 3 - Overview main findings for characteristics of critical incidents 
Characteristics of Critical incident Sources 
Standard operation with small changes 13 
Incidents often unexpected and difficult to anticipate 12 
Usually small timeframe to comprehend and react to situation 10 
Information lacking, wrong or misleading 9 
 
15 
 
Standard operation with small changes. A large portion of critical incidents offshore is a 
result of routine operations that have small alterations to them. The very unusual operations, like 
running a special tool or gravel packing almost never lead to an incident. In abnormal operations 
there is always performed Safe Job Analysis (SJA) and other incident preventative measures 
WRA, TOFS, on shore meeting, DOP and RAP. But in the routine operations, with small 
alterations, cues or elements can be ignored or forgotten. A lack of SA has been hypothesized to 
underlie the out of the loop performance decrement that can accompany automation (Carmody & 
Gluckman, 1993; Endsley, 1999). System operators working with routine tasks have been found 
to have a diminished ability to detect system errors and subsequently perform less on cognitive 
tasks in the face of routine failure as compared with non routine of the same task, for instance 
novices (Endsley, 1996, 1999; Godhavn, Pavlov, Kaasa, & Rolland, 2011; Kaber, Perry, & 
Segall, 2006). 16 of 19 incidents explained they conducted standard operations with small 
changes when incidents happened. 
"I ran into the well with a fullbore tool and I got told to boost riser while I 
ran this here, and it was done. We boosted with 1000 liters per minute. I ran 
in and had the speed in which I normally use to have with the Tool there, and 
I got a few hundred meters into the riser then it was suddenly full stops and I 
crash into the topdrive... ...then we discuss a bit, and get hold of the person 
who owns the tool and when it gets explained it's all apparent, so it shows 
that this tool has a spring in it so when we land tool in the wellhead then it 
collapses  a spring to seal off the tool completely tight. So when we get the 
explanation I understand immediately what has happened. When you get a 
head flow of 1000 liters per minute then this is enough that we collapses the 
spring, and then the tools seals up and gets stuck. This causes me to crash, 
then when then the resistance disappears in the form of the banana then the 
accumulated pressure presses the tool back in again." 
Incident often unexpected and difficult to anticipate. A lot of effort is used among 
offshore workers to be able to prevent incidents (Sneddon et al., 2006), and to prepare for any 
incidents that may occur. On a weekly HSE meeting on board there are safety alerts that are read 
out loud for the whole crew. These contain all the serious incidents that has happened in the last 
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6 weeks in the offshore industry. They describe the incident, underlying reasons for the incident, 
preventative measures and procedures to be implemented to avoid reoccurrence. In most 
companies all higher level personnel in drilling go through a bi yearly course in well control the 
International Well Control Forum (IWCF) course. This aims to give all higher level personnel 
offshore insight in the main operation on oil rigs - Drilling. The things that often lead to an 
incident is the unforeseen. This means nobody has thought of it, and it's very difficult to train for 
an event that is not thought of. There were only 2 out of 19 incidents that was anticipated, this 
means that 17 incidents came unexpected. Can the drilling companies train even more to be 
preventative. Here are a quote from the participants illustrating this. 
"We ran in the hole with casing, suddenly we could not come further down. I 
tried a couple of times with no luck. Finally I tried to pull up, it was then 
evident that one of the segments on the slips had broken off. And with this 
PS30 slips the segments are below rotary. So as I pulled up one segment 
broke off and fell into the well, and that is critical. I should not have pulled 
up before securing that piece, but that is hindsight thinking, and that don't 
help." 
Usually small timeframe to comprehend and react to situation. The timeline from 
perception SA level 1 to projection SA level 3 and action can be very brief. This means that 
reaction and action should be drilled in advance to effectively and correctly react to situations 
(Klein, 1993). In the backbone of all the participants securing the well is primary and precede all 
other actions. And this is drilled so well among the drilling crew that the timeline for securing 
the well with a kellycock is usually below 60 seconds. 13 of 19 incidents reported small 
timeframe to make decision. This does not mean that there was an imminent danger if the 
decision was not meet, but there was a small timeframe to avoid an incident to occur. 
"Pulled 3-4 more stands then we saw that this volume did not match, so we 
took a time out to clarify what could happen here now, since we had a good 
flow check. As we turned around to see what could happen, the fire came. 
Fast as hell. It just came, it was just.. the flame shot straight up into the air. I 
threw myself around and shut the well, and it was in the nick of time." 
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"So I sat in the chair then, no I had compensator up then, that was it, well 
suddenly the DDM starts to creep and creep down pretty fast, so I try to run 
it on air as to bring it up again, and nothing happens and no matter what I do 
and try to run up the stick right? Then comes the DDM here only in fairly 
good speed down until the elevator just smashes in the slips, it smashes hard. 
It then turned out, when we looked for the fault, it was quite hard to find the 
reason there then. There was a valve that had something wrong with the 
inner parts." 
Information lacking, wrong or misleading. The theory of SA draws upon the 
fundamentals of information processing, in that it is a cognitive process that involves the 
perception of information from the environment, and the amalgamation of this information with 
what is already known to form an understanding of the situation, all within the confines of the 
working memory (Smith & Hancock, 1995; Sneddon et al., 2006). The correct information 
beforehand or during an incident is paramount to making the right decision. 12 of the 19 
incidents reported that they had lacking, wrong or misleading information prior to making a 
decision. This does not mean that this decision was used to make a wrong decisions, just that 
information of that caliber was available to the participant at the time of the incident. 
"So I asked should I press the emergency stop now? Until we have the carrier 
in place? This was considered because when the emergency stop is activated 
the brakes clamp on more securely. What we did not know about this system 
here is that first the brake went off, and so on again with full force. So it fell 
2meter the whole thing. 200 tons 2 meters, that shakes things up a bit." 
Characteristics of decisions during critical incidents 
During the interviews 8 themes stood out in describing the characteristics of decisions 
during critical incidents. Like the characteristics of critical incidents the author deduced the 
importance of these themes from the thematic analysis of the interviews, and found the 
importance of each theme due to the description from the participants. We'll look into some of 
them with reference to interviews in the next part of the thesis. 
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Table 4 - Overview main findings for characteristics of decisions during critical incidents 
Characteristics of decisions during critical incident Sources 
Cues were sorted based on experience and information gathering 17 
Imperative to secure most critical element first 16 
Cardinal decision made on experience and instinct 10 
Experienced projection of consequence determine action 11 
Decision made as a team 7 
Look for trends to detect changes that can predict outcome 6 
Time out to figure out situation 5 
Information prior to incident influenced decision 2 
 
Cues were sorted based on experience and information gathering. The natural 
occurrence in SA is to first achieve Level 1 - perception in order to reach the higher levels 
(Endsley, 1995b). What was found in drilling is that the cues was not apparent during the 
initiation of the incident, they were gathered and sorted as a reaction to the incidents. 17 out of 
the 19 incidents were unexpected. And in most of the incidents the participant did not look up 
any procedure to make the decision, it was based on experience or cues or information gathered 
after the incident had initiated. 12 of the 19 incidents followed procedure during the incident, 
mostly that was because the experience guided actions within the procedure, they had been 
drilled enough on procedure that it was the natural choice during decision. Procedure was the 
experience. The participants reported directly thus, the last information was deducted from the 
transcript.  
Table 5 - Overview decisions during critical incidents 
Node number - Decision Sources References 
242 - Decision made based on procedure 3 3 
243 - Decision made based on experience 6 9 
244 - Decision was trial and error 2 2 
245 - Decision based on instinct 2 2 
 
One participant described decision made from experience and information gathering like so: 
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"In this situation it started to blink in the emergency lights, then the alarm 
went off. There was no PA announcement so I called the control room to find 
out what was happening. Nothing they said. Then one roughneck said he 
smelled smoke. I stopped and told them to check the drawworks. It has 
happened before that some electrical wires on the drawworks have melted 
and caught fire. They did not find anything. Then the alarm went off again, 
the lights started flashing, and suddenly everything went black. Then there 
came a PA with information about a fire. Then we monitored the well with a 
guys using a flashlight into the rotary." 
Imperative to secure most critical element first. In 16 incidents, the first thought of all 
participants was to secure the well, either as monitoring or as intervention. Persons who are 
subject to advanced training show an increase in the number of new information elements that 
comprise their SA, an increase in the overall level of interconnectivity between those elements, 
an increase in the criticality of new and existing elements(Klein et al., 1998; Strater et al., 2001; 
Walker, Stanton, Kazi, Salmon, & Jenkins, 2009; Øvergård et al., 2014).  
"I immediately think of the well, if the tool is sealed we do not have readings 
from the well, we do not have control of the well. Ehh, we open a failsafe, a 
valve below the BOP which provides communication with the well up another 
line than annulus and drill string, we then get readings from the wall and can 
confirm no abnormal pressures in the well." 
Decision made as a team. Much of the work on an offshore installation/rig requires 
teamwork. The successful attainment of the drilling task is entirely dependent upon the crew 
collectively working together, therefore team members must have a mutual understanding of the 
situation. In essence, the team should have a collective SA: this shared awareness is known as 
team SA (Baker, Day, & Salas, 2006; Endsley & Robertson, 2000; Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 
2001; Shu & Furuta, 2005). Team SA can be characterized as follows: "process by which team 
recourses, activities and responses are organized to ensure that the tasks are integrated, 
synchronized and completed within established temporal constraints" (Day, Zaccaro, & Halpin, 
2004) This shared knowledge and understanding of a given situation can then be called upon in 
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order for the crew to make critical decisions and adapt, in order to react to and predict their 
working environment. Team SA is superior to single SA but it's imperative that each member has 
SA covering their respective part of the team or the team SA can be a hindrance (Endsley & 
Robertson, 2000; Gorman, Cooke, & Winner, 2006; Nofi, 2000; Salmon et al., 2008). In 7 of the 
19 incidents the decision was made with help from the team, in one of the instances with a small 
timeframe to decide a supporting team member was present when the incident occurred. 
Whenever something happen on the drillfloor that impacts a timeframe of more than 15 minutes 
a higher level personnel is informed, thus most incidents will have impacts from multiple 
sources. The only exception to this rule is if the timeline from incident to consequence is too 
short for conference. One participant reported this team decision. 
"I called the toolpusher, and he came up. We decided to get a roughneck to 
look into the well for mud levels. And we had some manual valves behind the 
doghouse that we could turn to get the string off bottom." 
Operations, consequences and base events.  
The operations were first divided into 10 themes, as the analysis progressed it was natural 
to merge some of the themes. This process was done three times, it then emerged 4 different 
themed operations at the occurrence of the incidents, described further on as themes. These 
offshore drilling themes were; Tripping in/out of hole, Drilling, Down hole operations and 
Offline activity.  Furthermore the incidents were divided into 5 categories of consequence and 5 
categories of base events.  
Table 6 - Overview themes and categories 
Themes drilling operations Categories of consequence Categories of base event 
Running in/out of hole with string Death, lost rig & well  Lacked well-control  
Drilling Personnel injury  Lacked experience 
Down hole operations Lost well Procedure not followed 
Offline activity Emergency disconnect Human error 
 Lost rig time Equipment failure 
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All the resulting themes and categories were generated based on the participants interview 
and the situations leading up to the incidents. All themes are well established notions in the 
offshore drilling domain, and recognizable within the whole drilling industry. An overview with 
relationships between theme and categories can be seen in Table 7, Table 8 Table 9. 
Table 7 - Relationship Between Type of Operation and Base Event 
  
Base event 
 
    Total 
  
Equipment 
failure 
Lacked 
experience 
Procedure not 
followed 
Human error 
Lacked well-
control 
 
Type of 
operation Tripping with string 
4 0 0 4 3 11 
 
Drilling 
0 0 0 1 4 5 
 
Down hole operations 
0 1 0 0 1 2 
 
Offline activity 
0 0 1 0 0 1 
Total  4 1 1 5 8 19 
 
A statistical cross tabulation analysis summarized the categories to provide a picture of the 
interrelation between the categories. The chi-square test showed a significant relationship 
between type of operations and bare event. (χ2= 33.43, df = 12, p = .00083, see  
Table 7) When looking at the numbers this is because of two incidents. There was only one 
incident containing Offline activity paired with Procedure not followed. This gives a boost in 
statistical significance. There is also only two incidents containing Down hole operations, 
whereas one of these was the only incident containing the Lack of experience. This will also 
contribute to a marked increase in statistical significance. If removing the Down hole activity 
and down hole operations from the analysis the chi-square gives χ2 =4,297, df=2, p=.117 In the 
two other comparisons , between Type of operation and Incident consequence (χ2 = 12,081, df = 
12, p = .439, see Table 8); Base event and Incident consequence χ2 = 16.86, df = 16, p = .395, 
see Table 9. The Chi Square test did not indicate any dependency between types of operation and 
base events or types of operation and consequence, as the results were to be considered non-
significant. 
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Table 8 - Relationship Between Consequence of Incident and Types of Operation 
  
Consequence of incident 
 
   Total 
 Lost rig time 
Emergency 
disconnect 
Lost well 
Personnel 
injury 
Death, lost rig & 
well 
 
Type of 
operation 
Tripping with string 
7 2 2 2 0 13 
 Drilling 
2 1 2 0 1 6 
 Down hole operations 
1 0 1 0 0 2 
 Offline activity 
0 0 0 1 0 1 
Total  10 3 5 3 1 22 
 
Table 9 - Relationship Between Base event and Consequence of Incident 
  
Consequence of incident 
 
   Total 
 Lost rig time 
Emergency 
disconnect 
Lost well 
Personnel 
injury 
Death, lost rig & 
well 
 
Base event Equipment failure 
3 0 1 1 0 5 
 Lacked experience 
0 0 1 0 0 1 
 
Procedure not 
followed 0 0 0 1 0 1 
 Human error 
3 2 0 0 0 5 
 Lacked well-control 
3 1 3 1 1 9 
Total  9 3 5 3 1 21 
 
Results of the thematic analysis 
During the total 14 interviews with the participant a thematic analysis of the 19 recalled 
critical incidents were organized into themes with sub themes. All in all the interviews were 
coded with a total of 996 nodes using 1849 references. During the open minded coding it was 
generated 111 unique nodes from two interviews. During coding of preconceived theories of 
Situation Awareness it was generated another 73 nodes. The author then merged many of the 
nodes into themes, this worked out as a mix of open minded and preconceived nodes. This 
generated 3 main themes with a total of 24 sub themes. The sub themes resulted in list with a 
total of 73 unique themes (see APPENDIX 5 - Overview mixed transcribed nodes).  
Habitual day offshore. All participant got the same question during the interview. Q1 
"Can you describe a regular workday in drilling?" From this question it emerged 12 themes, the 
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themes that only occurred once in the interviews was discarded, so that 6 themes remained (see 
Table 10). 
Table 10 - Themes in a habitual day offshore 
Theme Sources References 
01 Perception of upcoming operation 13 15 
02 Handover 10 11 
03 Team SA 8 10 
04 Workload 7 9 
05 Procedure 3 3 
06 Learning 2 2 
 
On participant described a normal day in offshore drilling like this: 
"A normal day in drilling operations. It starts at 6:30 downstairs office. 
Where we have a quarter 20 minutes with handover and with something 
about the expectations that we are going face. Then it's some information 
from the crew that goes off so we are a little more prepared and informed 
about the hitch we go into. Then it's down to change and go to work, and try 
to be at work, well before at 0700. Then there is a handover at the workplace 
where we learn what has happened and what we should know to go through 
current operations . As soon as possible after we have had the handover we 
try to take a small meeting in the driller cabin on what we will do during the 
day with the guys working on the drill floor, so they know a bit the same 
things that we drillers do... and when we had that meeting we will discuss 
some procedures and stuff. And what we need to do then, also we proceed 
with the operation." 
 
Thematic analysis. During the thematic analysis of the 19 incidents recalled during the 
interviews 73 unique themes were found, this was merged into 24 sub themes and 3 main 
themes. The main themes that occurred during the coding was "Influencing factors", "Situation 
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Awareness", "Information". These 3 themes occurred in all 19 incidents, and are considered to be 
the main result of the thematic analysis. We will in the next sections look further into each main 
theme and some of the most important sub themes. 
  
Table 11 - Overview main results of the thematic analysis 
Main theme 
Total 
References Sub theme Sources References 
Situation Awareness 215 
Change in SA 14 59 
SA Level 2 - Comprehension 14 35 
SA Level 1 - Preception 14 32 
Decision 16 31 
SA Level 3 - Projection 14 26 
Team SA 11 18 
Expectations (preconceptions) 9 14 
Influencing factors 142 
Experience (long term memory stores) 14 39 
External factors 13 30 
Stress and Workload 6 15 
Performing actions 8 14 
Interface & system design 6 9 
Training 6 8 
Time 5 7 
Complexity 4 6 
Attention 4 4 
Automation 4 4 
Support 3 3 
Difficult to process information. 3 3 
Information 123 
Information 14 71 
Procedure 10 25 
After Action Review 7 15 
Handover 10 12 
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Situation Awareness. SA was the prominent theme in the findings. It was found that in the 
open minded analysis SA occurred adjusted almost as many times (open minded analysis of 
interview 1; 32 of 76 nodes = 42,1%) as in the final analysis (43 of 107 nodes = 40,1%). SA was 
referred to 215 times in 14 interviews. The participants reported that situation awareness was a 
key factor to be able to perform the work. Here is a statement by one participant regarding work 
offshore: 
"I often find that  I perform measures that one should not get a critical 
incident, we do all the time. That's what a lot of our work involves, control 
events so they do not become critical. That's is what risk assessment and risk 
management is. Proactive, we do it all the way. What could happen, what 
should we do, is this safe huh, what .. When we do it either way then. Alas, we 
are constantly thinking against critical events, but to prevent them then." 
SA is thought to work in levels. The first step in achieving SA is to perceive the status, 
attributes and dynamics of relevant elements in the environment - SA Level 1. Based on 
knowledge of Level 1 elements, particularly when put together to form patterns with the other 
elements (gestalt), the decision maker forms a holistic picture of the environment, 
comprehending the significance of objects and events - SA Level 2. The ability to project the 
future action of the elements in the environment, at least in the very near term, form the third and 
highest level of SA- SA Level 3 (Endsley, 1995b). What was found in this study did not follow 
these levels in all cases. 
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Figure 4 - Overview of SA level among participants during critical incidents. 
 
In 17 of the incidents the participants did not anticipate the incident occurring. In the 2 
incidents where participants did anticipate the outcome, they also went through the different SA 
levels as predicted (Endsley, 1995b; Judge, 1992; Salmon et al., 2008; Øvergård et al., 2015) 
following SA1, SA2 then SA3. Out of 12 participants that did not perceive the cues, did not 
reach SA Level 1, 8 continued to comprehend the situation, reach SA Level 2. That mean they 
comprehended the situation, and were able to react with that information as one of the guides, 
despite not perceive the cues in the situational elements. 7 of these participants were able to 
predict the future outcome of the critical incident. 3 participants were able to predict the outcome 
of the critical incident without apprehending the situation. In total in 13 of the incidents the 
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participant were able to predict the final outcome and make appropriate decisions to prevent a 
major incident. 
  
 
Figure 5 - Overview decision parameters and strategy 
As we can deduce from this chart there were a majority of incidents that came unexpected. 
This is natural due to the fact that expected incidents usually are prevented, and don't reach a 
critical level. On the left there is a overview of what top level consequence could occur if 
incident is not controlled. 11 of 19 incidents reached their top level consequence; 1 lost well and 
10 lost rig time did occur as a result of the critical incidents recollected by the participants. 3 out 
of 4 incidents where procedures were not followed reached top level consequence. 8 out of 14 
incidents where procedures were followed reached top level consequence. 
Discussion 
The purpose for this study was to find out what characterized critical incidents offshore and 
what characterized the decisions made during a critical incident. One major finding in 
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characterization of critical incidents were that most incidents happened because small alterations 
were done to routine tasks. Quote when asking if other information could have helped situation: 
"No, this was something I had done many times before, and it was a standard 
operation and.... no." 
When small alterations are done, the task can be perceived as a routine task and SA is 
lowered accordingly (Endsley & Garland, 2000), when in fact SA should be higher due to the 
alteration. The work on the drillfloor is constantly changing from one type of operation to 
another. The work is very dynamic and parts of the operation is quite socio-technical, especially 
for the drillers. Despite this much of the operations are routine for the drillers and roughnecks. 
When operations and tasks become routine, workers tend to become complacent, this makes it 
more likely for accidents to happen (Perrow, 1994; Reason, 1990). There is supporting research 
for this in shipping (Hansen, Nielsen, & Frydenberg, 2002) where it was found that chances for 
accidents happening were higher during routine work than non routine work. Another supporting 
study (Kines, 2003), found that more SA Level 1 cues were perceived during non-routine work 
than routine work. When personnel conduct routine tasks they tend to lower SA, this is because 
the task is so "automatic" that changes takes less effort to detect cues. This is true as long as the 
task is exactly the same on all occasions, but in a dynamic environment as offshore drilling we 
should avoid lowering SA even during routine tasks. Changing persons performing the tasks and 
regular breaks can help keep SA high (Klein, Pliske, Crandall, & Woods, 2005). It is legitimate 
to propose that some participants in this study have been on "automatic" in routine operations 
when incidents occurred, not recognizing cues to their surroundings that may have helped in the 
situation. Another of the major findings in incident characteristics were that most of the 
incidents, 17 out of 19, were unexpected. The author recognize that this is the normal nature of 
incidents, and that if it was expected it could be dealt with. To be able to identify hazards earlier 
the offshore industry needs to look into additional training. The only way to expect the 
unexpected is to be aware that it's a possibility, and to do that one needs training. This is 
supported by (Walker et al., 2009, p. 686) who found that drivers who are subject to advanced 
driver training show an increase in the number of new information elements that comprise their 
SA, an increase in the overall level of interconnectivity between those elements, an increase in 
the criticality of new and existing elements, and an increase in favorable driving behaviors.  
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Lacking, misleading or wrong information was also a contributor to lowering SA during 
the incidents. In many cases there were information the participants stated they could have 
gathered beforehand. As stated by one participant: 
I could always sought out the information, if I had though in those directions.  
For I knew well that when I landed this tool in the wellhead I collapsed a 
spring. It's just that I had not imagined that I could do the same with just the 
flow. 
Decisions during critical incidents were found to be taken much from experience. Much of 
the experience and skill of the participants coincided with procedures and thus their action were 
within procedures in the majority of incidents recollected for this study. Experience is one of the 
dominating factors in achieving high level of SA (Endsley & Garland, 2000), it provides a base 
to make a mental model that can be incorporated to predict future outcome. This is supported by 
(Doane, Sohn, & Jodlowski, 2004) who report that expert pilots are more successful in 
anticipating the future state of the flight. It is safe to assume that experienced drillers will be 
better at reaching SA level 3 and therefore have less incidents than less experienced drillers. 
Decisions made as a team were also prominent in the findings from the thematic analysis. In the 
biggest offshore drilling company in the world all incidents that take more than 15 minutes are 
reported live to a higher level personnel. Thus decisions regarding actions are likely to be 
conferred with others rater than alone. This also helps identifying cues and sort information 
correctly prior to taking action. In all incidents where the well was involved, the securing of the 
well was first priority. Therefore any action with that in mind were prioritized. This is due to a 
lot of drilling on this particular event, and further support the fact that training help SA during 
sudden changes in operation. 
For further investigation it is recommended to look at routine operations. This is a 
contributor to critical incidents and should be taken into account when working in such a 
dynamic environment. A study into the sequential use of Endsley's SA model could also be of 
interest since this and at least one other independent study (Øvergård et al., 2015, p. 13) show a 
discrepancy in the model.   
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Conclusion 
Sudden and unexpected changes in operation and experienced adoption to those changes 
characterized critical incidents in offshore drilling. In this dynamic and hazardous working 
environment the primary concern for all involved is the securing of the well during any incident. 
The huge amount of training in this regard help instinctive reactions towards that goal. Routine 
complacency is a major contributor to incidents happening, and steps to avoid routine automation 
should be considered by all involved in drilling operations. Decision making offshore is 
naturalistic and recognition primed and follow closely the known model (Klein, 1993). Some 
inconsistency with the sequential SA model (Endsley, 1995b) were found in the data. 
Participants achieved higher level SA in some cases without doing it consecutively.      
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APPENDIX 1 - Demographic questioner 
 
Demographic questioner 
Sex Male  Female  
Age  
Do you have education within offshore drilling? Yes  No  
How many years of experience in offshore drilling?  
 
 
How many years have you worked as a driller?  
 
 
Describe your education / certification: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Describe your drilling experience. (type of rig, type of drilling systems, type of operations, 
your position on board, how many years on different rig types..) 
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APPENDIX 2 - Interview questions 
1. Can you describe a regular workday on Drillfloor  
2. We are going to talk about critical incidents in this interview.  
-How do you define critical incident?  
-Do you experience critical incidents often when doing operations on drillfloor?  
-How often would you say critical incidents occur?  
 
3. Can you remember a critical incident?  
- What happened? Please describe. 
  
4. What were you trying to achieve when this incident occurred?  
 
5. How did you act?  
-Which cues had influence on how you made your decision?  
-How did you become aware that something was wrong?  
-What were you looking for? 
-Which information in your surroundings…?  
-Which information did you use to reach your decision?  
 
6. Did you expect something to occur?  
-How did such expectations affect your decision?  
 
7. Can you describe which information were available for you at the time?  
-Did you use all available information?  
-Can you think of other information which could have been useful?  
 
8. What was the most important piece of information available?  
 
9. Were you at any time uncertain about the reliability or relevance of the information 
available to you?  
-Were you at any time uncertain about your decision?  
 
10. Could you have acted differently in this situation? Made a different decision?  
 
11. Was it at any point challenging to process the information available to you?  
-How did it affect you?  
 
12. In this incident, were you reminded of previous experiences, where a similar decision 
was made?  
 
13. In this incident, were you reminded of previous experiences, where a different decision 
was made? 
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APPENDIX 3 - Transcription of random interview 
Intervjuer:   
Så da begyner vi med 1, det er om du kan beskrive en vanlig dag med boring, når du sitter og 
borer. Det her kommer til å gjelde littegranne det å sitte å bore da. 
Deltager:  
det er det vi sikter oss litt inn på om du har noen hendelser rundt akkurat rundt boring, fordi det 
er veldig sammenlignbart med.. 
Deltager:  
Boring eller brønn? 
Intervjuer:  
Ja brønn i og for seg, for det tripping, boring, det går litt på det samme med at man sitter å 
konsentrerer seg lenge også. Så.. Boring og brønn. 
Deltager:  
Ja, en vanlig dag som borer, da begynner man jo da med handover, møte i lag med de som har 
hvert på jobb. Typisk assisterende boresjef, og kunderepresentant før du går på skift. Ehh, der du 
går igjennom relevante ting som har skjedd i løpet av skiftet som har hvert, ehh du går igjennom 
det som du regner med skal skje på ditt eget skift, du belyser hvor risikoen er størst. Hva du skal 
ha spesiellt fokus på, den type ting. Så går du i drillerbua også får du da i tillegg handover av 
avtroppende person i samme stilling. Ehh, du snakker endel om rundt signaler som har blitt 
tolket, hvordan de har blitt tolket. Du gjør deg opp litt meninger selv rundt det som de har sett. 
Ehh, ja. ehh Så setter du deg i stolen og fortsetter operasjonen der som du har kommet. eeeh Du 
får de rundt deg til å gjøre de sjekken som du vil forsikre deg om at ting er som de skal være. 
Typisk opplining på choke, ehhh gjerne ta en runde på sirkulasjonssytemet, shaker og sånn. Se at 
alt er i orden. Ehhh, standpipe er linet riktig og sånn. Du kopierer ikke de som har hvert på sine 
oppysninger om alt nødvendigvis, du sjekker det selv for å hvite hva man har med å gjøre. Ja.. 
Intervjuer:  
Det høres jo veldig ut som den normale dagen med boring det. Ehh, vi skal snakke om kritiske 
hendelser i intervjulet, og om du da har noen personlige erfaringer med det. 
Deltager:  
Ja. 
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[avbrutt intervju av tredjepart som trengte informasjon fra PA] 
Intervjuer:  
Ehhhh, så da er det egentlig, ehh, både kritiske hendelser som har skjedd og om det  kunne ha 
skjedd på en måte. Om det er en eller annen hendelse som kommer og hvis den hadde utviklet 
seg så kunne det blitt en greie ut av det. Og om den har blitt avverget eller ikke og da er 
spørsmålet hva du legger i begrepet kritisk hendelse. 
Deltager:  
Ja kritisk hendelse det er jo da, ehh det er jo, sånn som jeg tenker umiddelbart så er det tre typer 
kritiske hendelser og det er jo type HMS relatert med folk, personnell som kan bli skadet. Det er, 
ehh, angående utstyr som kan feile. og det er brønn relaterte hendelser med tanke på reservoar og 
innstrømning i brønnen og den type ting. 
Intervjuer:  
Ehhh, når det gjelder brønn. Hva er det, er det noen kategorier med hendelser som går under 
kritisk da, som, ja det er vel i og for seg to ting, enten å miste mud i brønnen, eller å få. 
Deltager: 
 Ja det er jo, det kan jo være kritisk i begge situasjoner, men det er jo først og fremst det å få noe 
inn i fra formasjonen som er, som er det vi normalt tenker mest på. 
Intervjuer: 
 Ja, ehh opplever man ofte kritiske hendelser under boring? 
Deltager: 
Nei, jeg vil ikke si du opplever kritiske hendelser ofte. Det er, men det er ofte at du må eliminere 
en del signaler, du får, alt er jo basert på tolkning av signaler som du får ifra brønne og det er jo 
prosessene rundt hvordan ting blir vurder som kan eliminere en kritisk hendelse da, alså hvis 
man tolker signalene feil så kan man få en hendelse, tolker man det rett så kan man unngå en 
hendelse. 
Intervjuer:  
Ja, er det på alle de signalene man får som driller, er det veldig linket, eller er det veldig slått 
sammen med prosedyrer, eller er det erfaring som teller mest når man sitter å tolker signalene? 
Deltager:  
Ja, jeg vil jo, det er jo en kombinasjon selvfølgelig. Me jeg vil si at erfaring og, og ehhh, og, 
hmm kunnskap er jo det viktigste. 
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Intervjuer: 
 Ja. Hvor ofte vil du si at det oppstår kritiske hendelser ved boring? Har du et estimat der sånn? 
[Avbrutt PA melding] 
Deltager: 
Ehh, jeg vil si det er skjeldent, nå har vi veldig gode kunnskaper, kunnskap og ikke minst, ehhh, 
erfaring med, ehhh, for eksempel mud properties opp i mot de sorskjellige formasjonene, sånn at 
det er veldig skjeldent at vi har hull problemer. Mye skjeldenere enn før, og hull problemer i 
forbindelse med tap av sirkulasjon og avpakking og, stuck senario de blir skjeldenere og 
skjeldenere og det er jo ofte sånne situasjoner som kan lede til en mer alvorlig hendelse. Så jeg 
vil si at vi er i stand til å unngå brønnhendelse i mye større grad enn vi var før. 
Intervjuer: 
Ja, vi ligger jo et stykke forran enn i resten av verden. 
Deltager:  
Ja 
Intervjuer: 
 Ja, jeg vil påstå det. Ehh da går vi over til det også beskrive en kritisk hendelse, hvis du har en 
kritisk hendelse du har hvert med på eller en nære kritisk hendelse som har blitt avverget, om du 
har en sånn. 
Deltager: 
Ja, jeg har sikkert flere om jeg hadde fått tenkt meg lengere om, men en som jeg har tenkt litt på i 
det siste, ikke minst fordi at vi har hatt en lignenede situasjon, det var jo når jeg var driller og 
jeg, vi skulle teste BOP. Ehh, jeg kjørte inn i brønnen med et fullbore tool [Dette er del av 
borestrengen som nesten har samme diameter som hullet vi kjører inn i] og det hadde full åpning, 
altså full flow pasasje. Ehhh. Sånn at du kunne kjøre relativt fort med det selv om det var 
fullbore tool. Rett før jeg begynte den trippen [utrykk for å låre borestrengen ned i hullet] der så 
fikk jeg et spørsmål eller en, ehh, at det var ønske om å booste riseren mens jeg kjørte in med 
dette her, og det ble gjort. Vi boostet med 1000 liter i minuttet. Jeg kjørte inn og hadd den 
hastigheten inn som jeg normalt pleide å ha med det toolet der, og, og jeg kom et par hundre 
meter inn i riseren så var det pluttselig bom stopp, og, og krasjer topdrive'en [maskineri som 
brukes til å låre og heise borestreng i hullet] i standet [stand er to eller tre borerør som er skrudd 
sammen før det låres i hullet, dette er hule rør med han gjenger i ene enden og hun gjenger i 
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andre slik at de kan skris sammen. De er laget i ulike størrelser i stål. Alt fra 2 tommer til 8-10 
tommer. Mest vanlig størrelse er 3,5 - 5 og 5,5 tommer], og bøyer det som en banan ut over V-
døren [åpning i boretårnet som brukes til å hente ulike komponenter inn og ut via] ehhh, når jeg 
får stoppet så kommer standet opp igjen fra riseren og bare fortsetter og bygge på den bananen 
som allerede er. Alt blir svart for det er, ehh, mudden spruter fra toppen av pipen og  og tar 
sikten vekk i fra alle vinduer. Forstår jo selvfølgelig ikke hva som skjer. Ehhh, ringer boresjef, 
han kommer opp og vi forstår fortsatt ikke hva som har skjedd. Jeg tenker umiddelbart på 
brønnen atte hvis nå toolet er tett så har vi ikke avlesning på brønnen, vi har ikke kontroll på 
brønnen. Ehh, vi åpner en failsafe [en ventil nede på BOP som gir kommunikasjon med brønnen 
opp en annen line enn anulus og borestreng. Blir bla. brukt til å kontrolere unormale trykk i 
brønnen. og får lest av på chokelinen vår atte de ikke er noen unormale trykk. Ehhh, ja så får vi 
diskutert en del og får tak i han som eier toolet og det viser deg at når han får forklart seg, så 
virker dette toolet som .. det er en fjær i det så når vi lander toolet i wellheaden så kolapser vi 
den fjæra og da blir det helt tett. Så når vi får den forklaringen så forstår jeg jo med en gang hva 
som har skjedd. Da har jeg i tillegg til at jeg kjører i normal hastighet som nok i utgangspunktet 
nok var helt i grenseland. Nåd du da i tillegg får motflow på 1000 liter i minuttet så er dette nok 
til at vi kolapser den fjæra, og da blir toolet helt tett. Ehh, erego så kræsjer jeg i standet og i 
tillegg så har jeg jo da akkumulert en del trykk under toolet, så når da motstanden forsvinner i 
form av den bananen så trykker det akkumulerte trykket toolet opp igjen. 
Intervjuer:  
Stempel 
Deltager:  
Stempel ja. Ja. det er jo en hendelse som både, altså man må tenke på brønnen, ehh, som sådan. 
Fordi at man ikke har kontroll på den. Det er jo en fare for personell siden du kræsjer, og røret 
som sagt kommer ut i V-døra og og i tillegg utstyr. Ehh, Så den hendelsen inneholder jo egentlig 
alle de tre elementene som jeg snakket kritiske hendelse og... 
Intervjuer: 
 Ja definetivt. Var det åpent hull, var det utboret formasjon? 
Deltager:  
Jeg husker det ikke, men jeg regner med det, alså siden første tanken gikk på det at vi må få 
kontroll på brønnen. Så var det iallefall ikke en testet casing vi holdt på med for å si det sånn. 
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Intervjuer: 
Nei. Ja, ehh. Med en gang det her skjedde. Ehh det er klart det er jo ikke så lett å huske 
bestanding når det er lenge siden. det er ikke så lett å huske rett etter hendelsen heller. Men, 
hvordan reagerte du, hvilke signaler er det du, hva er det du hadde, hva slags informasjon hadde 
du rundt deg. 
Deltager:  
I og med at årsaken var helt opplagt når virkemåten til toolet kom frem. Så er det klart at det 
første, ehhh, første tiltaket som ble gjort det var at i alle de kommende operasjonsprosedyrene 
som inneholdt det toolet så ble for det første anbefalt hastighet oppgitt, og at man måtte 
revurdere hastigheten om vi boostet riseren i tillegg. Så hadde jeg sittet med de opplysningen i 
utgangspunktet så , da hadde det jo ikke skjedd da. 
Intervjuer:  
Nei ikke sant. Ehh, Fikk du noe, det her skjer jo såpass fort at man rekker jo ikke å få noen 
informasjon fra skjermene rundt deg i det hele tatt 
Deltager:  
Ingen ting, nei ingen ting. 
Intervjuer: 
 Du går jo bare rett i topdriven. 
Deltager:  
Det som er naturlig, når man først kollapser den fjæra der så, så er det sånn [knipser] 
Intervjuer:  
Ja, ehh. Så da har vi et par spørsmål her som egentlig går ut. Det er hvordan du ble klar over at 
noe var galt, og det var jo ikke så vanskelig å finne ut av. 
Deltager:  
Nei.. 
Intervjuer: 
Når pipen står som en banan så er det ganske innlysende. he he he. 
Deltager:  
Ja, det er en god indikasjon på ikke alt er som det skal. 
Intervjuer: 
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Ehhh, hvilken informasjon av det du hadde der brukte du for å ta din besluttning, jeg hørte du sa 
du åpnet failsafen også.... 
Deltager:  
Ja men informasjonen som førte til at jeg forsto hva som hadde skjedd det var jo informasjonen 
om virkemåten til toolet. Med en gang jeg hørte det så var det opplagt. 
Intervjuer:  
Så hvis prosedyrene for det toolet hadde hvert annerledes så ville jo ikke det ha hvert en hendelse 
i det heltatt. 
Deltager:  
Og, og. I disse her, det som vi kaller RAP her da, det som de kaller DOP for Statoil og der har du 
jo risk elementer som er listet opp, det var heller ikke listet opp der som en risiko 
Intervjuer: 
I den kjøreprosedyren som man får for hver seksjon. 
Deltager:  
Ja på fremsiden der så står det jo, så står det risk elementer så.. 
Intervjuer:  
Ja for det var jo ikke noen mulighet for å forvente at noe skulle skje her uten en sånn  
informasjon. 
Deltager:  
Nei. 
Intervjuer:  
Det er jo.. ehhh, Da har du egentlig belyst det neste spørsmålet om det var noen annen 
informasjon som kunne ha hjulpet, og det var det jo selvfølgelig hvis det toolet her.. Hvis det 
hadde skjedd med toolet tidligere og de hadde opplyst det så da hadde jo... Ehhh. Var du på noe 
tidspunkt usikker på pålitligheten eller relevansen av den informasjonen du fikk før det her. 
Deltager:  
 Nei det der var noe jeg hadde gjort mange ganger før, og det var en standard operasjon og.. Nei. 
Forskjellen var at vi boostet denne gangen da. Ja. Den motflowen var..1000liter.. Ja, det kan du 
plusse på hastigheten så.. 
Intervjuer:  
Ja for da får du jo.. Det er det samme som å kjøre enda fortere ned. 
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Deltager:  
Ja, det blir dobbelt så fort det nesten ja. 
Intervjuer:  
Ehhh, kunne du ha, i det det skjedde, jeg vet ikke. Var det en drawworks, elmago eller var det 
på.. 
Deltager:  
Nei, det var på en ramrig. 
Intervjuer:  
Ja så det var på ram ja, så det tar litt tid før han stopper, som vi har sett. Var det noe du, når du 
ser i ettertid, var det noe du kunne gjrt annerledes? 
Deltager:  
Jeg kunne jo oppsøkt informasjon, hadde jeg tenkt i de banene. For det er klart jeg visste jo at når 
jeg landed dette toolet i wellheaden så kollapset jeg en fjær. Det er bare at jeg hadde tenkt tanken 
at jeg kunne gjøre det samme  med flow da. 
Intervjuer: 
Men var det noe du kunne gjort annerledes i det det skjedde, for jeg regner.. ehhh tipper her. Du 
slapp vel egentlig bare stikka da eller..  
Deltager:  
Ja, bare slapp. 
Intervjuer:  
Ja det er ikke så veldig mye annet man kan gjøre i en slik situasjon. 
Deltager:  
Nei. 
Intervjuer: 
For du får jo ikke stoppet  
Deltager:  
Nei, også får du jo på en måte testet deg selv litt. Altså, jeg fant jo ut om meg selv at om jeg 
havent ut i noe slikt så var jeg rolig og tenkte de rette tankene og var jo den som tenkte brønn 
med en gang og fikk monitorert på chokelinen og.. Ja du får en, en bekreftelse på at du håndterer 
noe sånt noe da. For å si det sånn, og det, den får du ikke før du har prøvd. 
Intervjuer:  
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Det er.. Det er noen som sier at erfaring er en dårlig læremester, men innimellom så trengs den. 
Deltager:  
Ja den er en dyrbar eller dyrekjøpt lærdom, men det er ingenting man lærer mer  av. 
Intervjuer:  
Nei.. Det er helt riktig. Ehh, ble du minnet på noen tidligere erfaringer hvor noe lingnende har 
skjedd? 
Deltager:  
Nei det var jo det vi utfordret leverandøren av toolet på, at det ikke var en anbefalt 
kjørehastighet, det var noe som vi fikk etterpå 
Intervjuer: 
 Ja for det var jo... 
Deltager:  
Det kunne hvert unngått hvis de, hvis de hadde belyst den kjørehastigheten. 
Intervjuer: 
 Da er det vel tenkelig at de egentlig ikke hadde hvert ute for problemet tidligere da, for da ville 
de vel kanskje ha. 
Deltager: 
Tja, det går jo ann å anta, da men, men vi har jo sett det før da at det er masse sånne oplysninger 
som som aldri når frem til all da. 
Intervjuer:  
Ja for det er, det med at det er 6 crew på en rig bare kan jo gjøre at man mister informasjon, og 
hvis det da er forskjellige rigger i tillegg så er det jo. 
Deltager:  
Ja, men hadde han tool eieren han er jo, var jo alene på riggen som hadde med det toolet å gjøre, 
så det er klart hadde han hatt informasjonen og ført den videre så kunne det jo været ungått. Det 
viser seg jo, når hendelsen skjer så får du de opplysningen som man hadde trengt 
Intervjuer:  
Ja, man får det etterpå... JA det er den gode gamle etterpåklokskapen. Ehh, ja for da faller jo den 
siste ut. Om det er en annen besluttning som ble tatt i en annen situasjon som var lignende. Ehh, 
har du. Det var veldig bra. Takk skal du ha. Det er jo, som du sa egentlig en hendelse som 
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inneholder alle elementene på kritisk. Så den passer jo egnetlig veldig godt inn i det jeg trenger. 
Ehh, har du en annen som vi kunne gått igjennom også? 
Deltager:  
Nei, nå har jer ikke tid til mer. 
Intervjuer:  
He he he. Det er jo klart svar det. Det er veldig bra det.. Nok en gang tusen takk for at du ville 
delta. Det setter jeg veldig pris på. 
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APPENDIX 4 - Participant demographics 
NR Date Time Interviewer Transcriber 
Length 
Interview 
(min) Gender Age 
01 07.03.2015 13:19 Michael Tjelle Michael Tjelle 31 Male 44 
02 07.03.2015 14:21 Michael Tjelle Michael Tjelle 43 Male 40 
03 09.03.2015 02:10 Michael Tjelle Michael Tjelle 20 Male 50 
04 10.03.2015 11:09 Michael Tjelle Michael Tjelle 22 Male 48 
05 20.03.2015 09:17 Michael Tjelle Michael Tjelle 15 Male 50 
06 20.03.2015 04:35 Michael Tjelle Michael Tjelle 14 Male 58 
07 09.04.2015 02:10 Michael Tjelle Michael Tjelle 17 Male 41 
08 09.04.2015 02:48 Michael Tjelle Michael Tjelle 35 Male 28 
09 10.04.2015 02:35 Michael Tjelle Aurora Hylten 15 Male 38 
10 11.04.2015 17:15 Michael Tjelle Jeanine Desiree Lund 16 Male 46 
11 10.04.2015 06:35 Michael Tjelle Jeanine Desiree Lund 55 Male 44 
12 14.04.2015 03:17 Michael Tjelle Jeanine Desiree Lund 48 Male 47 
13 17.04.2015 17:57 Michael Tjelle Jeanine Desiree Lund 23 Male 46 
14 20.04.2015 07:30 Michael Tjelle Aurora Hylten 19 Male 34 
15 20.04.2015 19:03 Michael Tjelle Michael Tjelle 17 Male 57 
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NR 
Years in 
Drilling 
Years as 
Driller 
Educated in 
drilling Education level Education spesific 
01 14 7 Yes Technical College Teknisk fagskole boring 
02 17 7 Yes Technical College Teknisk fagskole boring 
03 19 3 Yes Technical College Teknisk fagskole boring 
04 17 9 Yes Technical College 
Teknisk fagskole boring 
Teknisk fagskole maskin 
Trade certificate 
05 24 9 Yes Technical College 
18 weeks drilling course 
Teknisk fagskole ongoing 
06 32 22 Yes Below college 
18 Weeks drilling course,  
DCAP driller one week 
07 20 5 Yes Technical College Teknisk fagskole boring 
08 10 3 Yes Technical College 
Brønnteknikk 
Teknisk fagskole boring 
09 14 4 Yes Technical College Teknisk fagskole boring 
10 17 3 Yes Technical College Teknisk fagskole boring 
11 17 9 Yes Technical College Teknisk fagskole boring 
12 22 4 Yes Technical College Teknisk fagskole boring 
13 16 4 Yes Technical College Teknisk fagskole boring 
14 12 3 Yes Technical College Teknisk fagskole boring 
15 30 3 Yes Technical College Teknisk fagskole boring 
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NR 
IADC 
course Experience spesific 
Years 
RAM rig 
Years 
Conventinal 
semisub 
01 Yes 
4 years TO winner, semisub; 3 years TO Barents, semisub 
RAMRIG 3,0 4,0 
02 Yes 
3,5 years semisub exploration drillig, completion 
3,5 years RAM rig exploration drilling, completion 3,5 3,5 
03 Yes RAM rig, semisubmersible. Drilling and completion 0,0 3,0 
04 Yes 
Drillship 8y; Plattform 4y; Semisubmersble 17y; Jackup 1y; 
RAM rig 11y 11,0 17,0 
05 Yes Semi-submersible 6y;  Safetycoach statoil 1y; RAM rig 3y 3,0 6,0 
06 Yes 
Semi-submerible. Ross rig, Ross isle, Southern explorer, 
Wildcat, Polar Pioneer, TO Arctic 0,0 22,0 
07 Yes 
Semi-submerible 3y 
RAM rig 2y 2,0 3,0 
08 Yes 
Semi-submerible TO Barents MH equipment, drilling and 
completion; Semi-submerible 6y 
Jackup 4y 3,0 0,0 
09 Yes RAM rig 8y; Semi-sub 5y; Drillship 1y 4,0 0,0 
10 Yes Semisubmersible; RAM rig 3,0 0,0 
11 Yes 
Semi-submersible, NOV, Cyber, Drillview, MH 
All operations; Driller 1; Mostly RAM rig 8,0 1,0 
12 Yes Semisubmersible; RAM rig 0,0 4,0 
13 Yes 
Semi-submersible; Plattform; Drillview, every operations, 
Driller; Semi-submersible 5y 
Plattform 11y 5,0 0,0 
14 Yes 
RAM rig 6,5y 
Semisubmersible 5y 3,0 0,0 
15 Yes 
RAM rig completion;  Semisub 12y 
RAM rig 18y; All positions drilling 3,0 0,0 
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APPENDIX 5 - Overview mixed transcribed nodes 
Name Sources References 
01 - Situation Awareness 14 153 
11 - Change in SA 14 59 
Level 2 - Comprehension of current situation 14 35 
122 - Negative 10 18 
121 - Positive 10 17 
Level 1 - Perception of elements in current situation 14 32 
111 - Positive 12 17 
112 - Negative 9 10 
113 - Elements 3 5 
Level 3 - Projection of future status 14 26 
131 - Positive 13 21 
132 - Negative 5 5 
02 - Human factors 14 108 
21 - Experience (long term memory stores) 13 39 
212 - Had past experience of situation 9 12 
213 - Did NOT have past experience of situation 7 12 
211 - Past experience triggered decision 5 11 
2111 - Triggered right decision 5 8 
2112 - Triggered wrong decision 2 3 
214 - Lacked experience 1 3 
251 - Experience most important skill 1 1 
24 - Decision 13 31 
243 - Decision made based on experience 6 9 
246 - Hindsight could have done differently 6 9 
247 - Hindsight could NOT have done differently 4 4 
242 - Decision made based on procedure 3 3 
241 - No time to react to situation 2 2 
244 - Decision was trial and error 2 2 
245 - Decision based on instinct 2 2 
26 - Expectations (preconceptions) 10 15 
263 - Lack of Expectations (did NOT expect incident) 8 9 
261 - Correct expectations (did expect something to happen) 3 4 
262 - Wrong expectations 2 2 
25 - Performing actions 8 13 
251 - Action helped situation 5 7 
252 - Action did NOT help situation 4 6 
23 - Training 6 8 
231 - Sufficient training 3 4 
232 - Lack of traning 2 2 
233 - Get training on possible critical incidents 1 2 
22 - Abilities 2 2 
221 - Sufficient abilities 2 2 
222 - Lack of abilities 0 0 
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07 - Description 14 96 
75 - Type of critical event 14 30 
INCIDENT NOT APLICABLE 6 9 
75 01b - Crane accident 1 1 
75 01 - Blackout due to fire - HUMAN ERROR - Emergency disconnect 1 3 
75 13 - Kick - WELLCONTROL - Lost rig, well, death 1 1 
75 12a - Dropped piece of slips in hole - EQUIPMENT FAILURE - Lost rig time 1 1 
75 12b - Dropped casing in hole, slips broke - EQUIPMENT FAILURE - Lost well 1 1 
75 02 - Blackout due to wrong handling of equipment - HUMAN ERROR - 
Emergency disconnect 
1 1 
75 03 - Downhole RIH fast with fullbore tool - WELLCONTROL - Personnel injury 
_ Emergency disconnect 
1 1 
75 11 - Operating on DDM with personnel in area - PROCEDURE NOT 
FOLLOWED -  Personnel injury 
1 1 
75 14 - Crash topdrive - HUMAN ERROR - Lost rig time 1 1 
75 15 - Stuck casing hanger - WELLCONTROL - Lost rig time 1 1 
75 15b Solenoid failure RAMrig - EQUIPMENT FAILURE - Lost rig time 1 1 
75 14b - Wrong operation of compensator - LACKED EXPERIENCE - Lost well 1 1 
75 02b - Stuck with liner in BOP - WELLCONTROL - Lost rig time 1 1 
75 05 - Stuck due to packoff - WELLCONTROL -  Lost well 1 1 
75 09 - Lost string due to wrong operation slips - HUMAN ERROR - Lost rig time 1 1 
75 10 - Crash with string due to tally error - HUMAN ERROR - Lost rig time 1 1 
75 08 - Shallow water flow - WELLCONTROL - Lost well 1 1 
75 07 - Stuck lose top hole - WELLCONTROL - Lost well 1 1 
75 07b - Break fail on drawworks - EQUIPMENT FAILURE - Lost rig 
time_Personell injury 
1 1 
75 06 - Pump out casing - WELLCONTROL - Lost rig time 1 1 
73 - Goal of the operation during accident 14 19 
73 13 - Backream after drilling - DRILLING 1 1 
73 12 - Run in hole with casing - RIH_POOH 1 1 
73 11 - Clean and tidy - OFFLINE ACTIVITY 1 1 
73 14 - Tripping out of hole - RIH_POOH 1 1 
73 14b - Sementing conductor - DOWN HOLE OPERATION 1 1 
73 15 - Cementing - DOWN HOLE OPERATION 1 1 
73 15b - Run casing - RIH_POOH 1 1 
73 01 - Pulling core - RIH_POOH 1 1 
73 02 - Drilling - DRILLING 1 1 
73 02b - Running in hole with liner - RIH_POOH 1 1 
73 05 - Pulling out after drilling - RIH_POOH 1 1 
73 09 - RIH with BHA - RIH_POOH 1 1 
73 03 - RIH to test BOP - RIH_POOH 1 1 
73 12b - RIH casing - RIH_POOH 1 1 
73 10 - RIH for logging - RIH_POOH 1 1 
73 08 - Drilling 26in hole - DRILLING 1 1 
73 07 - Drilling 26in section - DRILLING 1 1 
73 07b - Running BOP on riser - RIH_POOH 1 1 
73 06 - Drilling out shoe - DRILLING 1 1 
72 - Definition of critical event 14 15 
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71 - Normal day in drilling 14 14 
74 - How often critical incident occur 14 14 
76 - Personal feeling 3 4 
762 - Negative 1 1 
76 01 - Feeling unsafe 1 1 
76 02 - Boring 1 1 
763 - Feeling guilty 1 1 
04 - Affecting Situation Awareness 14 83 
48 - Team SA 11 18 
481 - Positive 10 13 
482 - Negative 5 5 
44 - Stress and Workload 6 15 
444 - Negative work situation 4 7 
442 - Negative 3 3 
443 - Night hitch 2 3 
441 - Positive 2 2 
43 - Interface & system design 7 12 
431 - Positive 5 6 
432 - Negative 5 5 
434 - Not interpeted correctly 1 1 
46 - System capability 7 9 
462 - Negative 5 6 
461 - Positive 3 3 
47 - Time 6 9 
471 - Enough time 4 4 
472 - Not enough time 2 3 
473 - How long ago incident happened 1 2 
42 - Complexity 5 7 
422 - Negative 5 7 
421 - Positive 0 0 
49 - Attention 4 6 
492 - Difficult to keep attention 3 4 
491 - Easy to keep attention 2 2 
41 - Automation 4 4 
412 - Negative 4 4 
411 - Positive 0 0 
45 - Support 3 3 
451 - Positive 2 2 
452 - Negative 1 1 
05 - Information 14 71 
56 - Procedure 11 25 
561 - Procedure followed 6 8 
563 - Procedure not available or valid 6 8 
562 - Procedure NOT followed 3 5 
564 - Procedure avaliable 2 4 
51 - Enough information 12 15 
55 - Not enough information 6 8 
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52 - Right information 4 5 
54 - Too much information 4 4 
51a - Confident about information 4 4 
51b - Unsure about information 4 4 
58 - Difficult to process information. 3 3 
581 - NOT difficult to process information 2 2 
582 - Difficult to process information 1 1 
53 - Wrong information 2 2 
57 - False alarm 1 1 
03 - External factors 14 28 
31 - Goals and Objectives 10 14 
311 - Clear Goals and Objectives 9 12 
312 - Unclear goals and objectives 2 2 
33 - Handover 11 12 
331 - Handover present 11 12 
332 - Handover not avaliable 0 0 
32 - Changed Goals and Objectives 1 1 
34 - Equipment failure 1 1 
341 - Emergency equipment faliure 3 4 
06 - After Action Review 7 14 
62 - Hindsight information that could prevented situation 6 9 
63 - Using story to explain situation 3 3 
61 - Actions was taken to prevent reoccurrence 2 2 
TOTAL OCCURANCE IN ALL INTERVEWS 720 1512 
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APPENDIX 6 - Node overview Situation Awareness coding 
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APPENDIX 7 - Node and reference overview pr interview 
Interview number Nodes References 
Interview 01 152 343 
Interview 02 138 331 
Interview 03 89 182 
Interview 05 88 163 
Interview 06 72 113 
Interview 07 117 218 
Interview 08 68 94 
Interview 09 66 88 
Interview 10 70 105 
Interview 11 84 144 
Interview 12 85 144 
Interview 13 86 151 
Interview 14 110 232 
Interview 15 98 179 
TOTAL 1323 2487 
 
Note: Interview 4 is missing due to corrupted audio file. 
Interview 2,7,12,14,15 contain 2 incidents the rest contains one incident. 
